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1. INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION AND BRIEF
DESCRIPTION OF APPROACHES
A tendency towards a decline in investment has been characteristic of the
Russian economy since the beginning of the 90s. The volume of the annual
Russian investment market is estimated as 20bn dollars. According to the
Russian Federation State Committee on Statistics, during 1992-1997 only
21.8bn dollars was invested in non-nancial sectors in Russia. Lately, the
dynamics of investment in Russia have become positive, but the total volume
decreased in 1997 by 5% (in comparison, in 1996 the rate of decline was
18.1%), and in the rst quarter of 1998, in comparison with the same period
of 1997, it was down by 7% . The dynamics of direct foreign investment in
Russia characterise the increase in the credibility of Russia to foreign investors,
but their absolute value is still very insignicant (less than 1% of GNP).
During 1997, foreign investment in the real sector of the Russian economy
was only 26.4 dollars per capita (in 1996 { 14.2 dollars), i.e. dozens of times
less than in eastern European countries (Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe ..., 1997).
The reasons for the unfavourable investment climate in Russia are well-known.
They are, rst of all, to do with the unstable political and economic situation
(changes in the legal system are dicult to forecast, and the actions of the
federal executive bodies and the subjects of the federation are not synchro-
nised); the too heavy tax burden; and the criminal situation (including in the
enterprise sphere). Russian and foreign investors are afraid that their projects
in Russia will not be eective because
| laws that contradict previous agreements can be adopted (for example
the elimination of tax credits);
| decisions on the submission of property rights to the investor can be
declared illegal;
| the economic policy of the country will change as a result of any change
in the political situation;
| after investments are made, new limitations on the entrepreneur may
appear which will lead to rejection of the further use of the enterprise.
The main methods of creating incentives for investment activity are also well
known. Among them are:
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 development of the system of state guarantees to investors (for ex-
ample through the creation of guarantee and mortgage funds which
accumulate the nancial resources of the state, rms and individuals);
 development of the investment insurance system;
 tax benets to the investors.
The rst two items have to do mainly with the regulation of investment at
state level, which is now in the rst stage of development in Russia (see, for
example, Petrakov et al. (1997)). Tax policy incentives are widely used in
Russia and have already given positive results in some regions. Lately, the
mass media and legal bodies have started a campaign against tax benets
(drawing connections, in many cases justiably, between tax benets and
corruption), but a favourable tax policy is the only realistic and available
instrument to attract foreign and domestic entrepreneurs.
Additional arguments in favour of this position are the results of the latest
poll of multinationals investing in European countries carried out by the con-
sultancy rm \Deloitte-Touche Tomatzu International" . The purpose of the
poll was to reveal the degree of inuence of tax incentives on investment
decisions.
From the answers obtained from 100 corporations, one can reach the con-
clusion that tax incentives might not be a decisive factor in the adoption
of decisions on allocation of new investments (more important are political
stability, the stability of the national currency, and the quality of labour) but,
all other things being equal, those countries which provide tax benets and
information on them are preferred. One of the main conclusions of the com-
pany experts is that \tax incentives are one of the most important weapons
for incentives to foreign investors".
Of the tax incentives, the most important from the point of view of the
respondents are low corporate income taxes. These are valued much more
highly than accelerated amortisation and export exemptions. It should be
noted that corporate income tax is a signicant portion of the total tax
burden and is one of the most important revenue portions of the budget; its
share of total tax revenues is about 1/4 (25.8% in 1995, 20.4% in 1996, and
17.8% in 1997 { according to Goskomstat data). According to the data of the
Russian Federation State Tax Service in 1995, corporate income tax revenues
were the largest in 10 out of the 11 Russian territories (in only the West
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Siberian region were they slightly less than the revenues from value added
tax). Lately there has appeared a trend towards a decrease in the share of
corporate income tax; but revenues from this source in the federal budget
still increased by 13% during the rst quarter of 1998 in comparison with
the same period of the previous year (at the same time, revenues from value
added tax decreased by 21%, and excise duties by 22%) .
The current Russian corporate income tax system is characterised by federal
and regional (territorial) tax rates as well as dierent tax exemptions. The
federal tax rate is 13%, while the regional rate is determined by local author-
ities, but should not be greater than 22%. In some regions, the local tax rate
is lower than the upper limit, for example in St.Petersburg (20%), Tatarstan
(19%), Nizhni Novgorod region (21%), Perm' region (17.5%). A description
of the main tax exemptions in the Russian regions is given in Appendix A.
Among the exemptions which decrease the eective tax rate, the most popular
are tax holidays, i.e. full or partial remission from income tax within certain
intervals following investment. These exemptions have been used in south-
eastern Asia, eastern Europe and some western European countries. One of
the most successful was the tax holiday programme in Puerto Rico, which
was initiated in 1949 (Bond (1981)). In the survey by Egorova et al. (1997),
it is pointed out that 10-15 year tax holidays have been introduced for so-
called pioneer corporations specialising in high-tech production in Singapore.
In Italy, beginning in 1986, there have been tax holidays for rms that have
been established in Southern Italy, where such exemptions are a regional
incentive.
In Russia, tax holidays are used in more than two dozen regions (including the
Novgorod region, Chuvashia, Tatarstan, Tver' region, Samara, Kaliningrad,
Yekaterinburg, etc.). Mainly, they have been inuenced by the growth in the
economic and political independence of the subjects of federation, which have
created new possibilities for the attraction of investors (including foreign ones)
for concrete projects, with the help of the adoption of regional laws on tax and
other exemptions, the creation of local guarantee funds, easier bureaucratic
procedures, etc.
Unlike the early 90s, during the most recent two years foreign investors have
begun to pay attention to regional investment projects.
The most vivid example is the Novgorod region, which has created a real
investment boom . In December 1994, the regional Duma adopted a law
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\On tax exemptions for enterprises located on the territory of the Novgorod
region". According to this law, enterprises with foreign investments which
are engaged in production and are registered on the territory of the region
are exempt from all regional taxes during the payback period. The law gives
regional enterprises exemptions of, on average, up to 30% of total tax con-
tributions to the local budget. Starting from January 1, 1997, four districts
of the region have been declared tax-free zones and the federal part of in-
come tax out of the local budget is redeemed to them. As a result, more
than 160 enterprises have been registered in the region with foreign invest-
ment (mostly from Germany, Finland, and the United States). The Western-
Russian Regional Venture Fund of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development gave 30m dollars for the nancing of investment projects, and
20m dollars were subsidised by the Italian government. Consequently, during
the three years between 1994 and 1996, the volume of foreign investment
increased from 3.5m dollars to 154m dollars. Russian companies invested in
the economy of the region 40bn rubles. According to the expert evaluation
of the World Bank, the Novgorod region is among the six most attractive
Russian regions for foreign investments.
In the economic literature, there are many publications on tax incentives for
rms already in existence. To be precise, they deal with the investigation of
the inuence of tax rates and other incentives, such as accelerated depreci-
ation, tax allowances on re-investment in production, and tax credits (see,
for example, Kueschnigg (1989), Daly et al. (1993), Feltenstein and Shah
(1995)). When capital is invested abroad and foreign subsidiaries of multina-
tionals are created, there appears an additional problem with tax credits and
deferrals (depending on the relationship between home and host tax systems)
with the purpose of avoiding double taxation (see Hines (1994), Mintz and
Tsiopoulos (1994) and the corresponding references there).
Unlike the above-mentioned topics, our paper deals with tax incentives for
investment in new rms. In order to clarify the motivation for our research,
we should briey explain its contents.
Let us consider an investment project that assumes the creation of a new
enterprise in a certain region that produces particular goods and consumes
particular resources. We will limit our investigation to the case when invest-
ments are direct and irreversible, i.e. they can not be withdrawn and used
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for other purposes. This investment project can be imagined as a certain
consequence of expenditures and outputs in physical units (the technological
description of the project) in time.
Considering prices for input and output production, the investor can calcu-
late expected prots before actually making an investment (virtual prots).
When calculating net present value (NPV) the investor should consider the
various factors of risk and uncertainty based on the dynamics of virtual prots.
First of all, the prices and demands of production can uctuate stochastically
depending on the situation in the market (the \market or economic" risk).
After investment, the prots of rms already in existence are negatively inu-
enced by dierent negative events, such as default, unpredictable actions of
the authorities, the lack of developed infrastructure, crime, etc. The above-
mentioned factors are called \institutional risks". Also, investor behaviour
depends on an evaluation of the probability of the loss of the rm (and in-
vestments also) as a result of any change in the political course and the
creation of unacceptable situations. This factor is called \political risk".
The behaviour of the investor is presumed to be rational in the sense that,
while looking at the virtual prot from a given project (and evaluating the
situation in a certain region), a decision can be adopted either to invest or
to postpone for some time in order to receive information on the situation in
the economic environment (for example on the change in virtual prots). So,
the objective of the investor is to choose the optimal moment for investment
depending on the information that has been obtained before this time.
The region can actively inuence investor behaviour, accelerating presence
with the help of tax exemptions, for example appropriate intervals of tax
holidays. We consider that the purpose of the region for a given project is
the maximisation of the discounted tax payments into the regional budget
during the existence of the enterprise.
Within the proposed framework of interaction between the region and the
investor, the following tasks are investigated:
- determination of the optimal investment rule as a function of all the
parameters of the problem;
- investigation of the dependence of the main economic indicators of the
region, investor and federal centre on the parameters of uncertainty,
risk, and tax exemptions (comparative statics);
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- comparison of dierent factors (the parameters of the project, federal
and regional rates of income tax, tax exemptions, discount values and
political risk) according to their inuence on investment activities;
- evaluation of the eectiveness of the mechanism of tax exemptions,
depending on the above-mentioned factors;
- determination of the range of parameters (that characterise these fac-
tors) inside which tax exemptions can compensate for unfavourable risk
factors and provide positive eects for the regional and federal budgets;
- comparison of the \optimal" tax exemptions (i.e. those within the
proposed model) with those existing in reality in the dierent regions
of Russia.
The starting point for our research is the McDonald-Siegel model (McDonald
and Siegel (1986)) which was developed and described in detail in Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). These papers deal with the model of investor behaviour in
which the prot after investment in a certain project is described by a stochas-
tic process (geometric Brownian motion), while investments are considered
to be irreversible. The purpose is to nd the optimal moment for investment.
The approach to this problem proposed in these papers is related to Con-
tingent Claims Analysis (CCA). Investment is interpreted as the purchase of
American call options on the right to make investments in the future. The
expiry date of this option is the optimal moment of investment. One of the
main assumptions of such a model concerns the availability on the securi-
ties market of a nancial asset, the price of which is completely correlated
with the market price of the realised investment project. It is assumed that
the nancial market is in equilibrium, and in particular that it satises the
conditions of the known Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM).
The model of the investor proposed in this paper is an extension of the
McDonald-Siegel model by the inclusion of the existing Russian corporate
income tax system, as well as political and institutional risks.
However, the approach to the investigation of this problem, related to the
use of CCA methods and the CAPM, is not suitable for economies with
undeveloped nancial markets (including the Russian economy). For this
reason, we use other methods, based on the optimal stopping theory for
stochastic processes, for the investigation of the investor model. In this
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case, the optimal rule (according to the NPV criterion) is interpreted as
the moment of optimal stopping of the process of observed virtual prots.
Thus, the lack of investment (investment waiting) is the consequence of
the assumptions of the rational behaviour of the investor. For the solution
of the optimal stopping problem (for establishing the optimal investment
level), instead of the traditional heuristic \smooth pasting" method (see, for
example, McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), we propose
a rigorous approach based on the direct evaluation and further variation of an
optimised function. The investment rule, obtained in analytical form, allows
the region to compare the dierent principles of the determination of tax
holidays, in particular to optimise their duration from the point of view of tax
payments into the regional budget, depending on the parameters of the tax
system.
This paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we describe a model of
an investor who is interested in a certain investment project and waiting for
the appropriate moment to invest. Investigation of this model is carried out
in Section 4, under certain assumptions about the process of obtaining prot
from the project that are made in Section 3. It turned out that the solution of
the problem of the proposed investor can be found in an explicit form. We use
obtained analytical formulas both for the analysis of the dependencies of the
economic indicators (related to the project) on the parameters of the model
(which are characterised by uncertainty, risk, and tax exemptions) as well
as for the comparison of the inuence of dierent factors (the parameters
of the model) on investment activity. In Section 5, dierent principles of
the determination of tax holidays are analysed. \Optimal tax holidays" that
maximise discounted tax payments into the regional budget are dened. On
the basis of calculations (using adjusted real data), a mechanism of optimal
tax holidays is compared with existing principles in Russian regions. In Section
6 we make some conclusions about the proposed model. Finally, Appendix A
contains a list of the main tax exemptions (for investors) in Russian regions
and in Appendix B we give proofs of the main mathematical results (Theorems
1 and 2 from Section 4.1).
The authors are very grateful to Prof. R. Ericson for a number of useful
considerations and discussions which helped us improve this work.
12
2. THE BASIC MODEL { THE INVESTOR'S PROBLEM
Under consideration as an object of investment will be a project for the
creation of a new enterprise (involved in production) in a certain region of
a country.
1
Investments I, necessary for the project, are considered to be
instantaneous and irreversible, so that they can not be withdrawn from the
project and used for other purposes after the project was started (sunk costs).
One can think of an investment project as a certain sequence of costs and
outputs expressed in units (the technological description of the project). For
this reason, while looking at current prices on both resources and output, the
investor can evaluate the prot from the project; this would be prot after
the investment was made and, before the moment of investment, one can call
it prot, i.e. the hypothetical prot under the conditions that the investment
would be made at the initial (zero) moment.
2
The most important feature of the model is the assumption that at any
moment the investor can either the project and start with the investment,
or the decision before obtaining new information on its environment (prices
of the product, demand, etc.), i.e. on the changes in the virtual prot from
the project. For example, if someone wishes to invest in the creation of a
plant for fuel production, the prices of which increase, it makes sense to delay
the investment in order to receive greater virtual prot (but not for too long
because of the time discount eects).
The economic environment can be inuenced by dierent stochastic factors
(uncertainty in market prices, demand, etc.). For this reason, we consider that
the prot from the project (including all taxes and payments except corporate
income tax)
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can be described by a stochastic process  = (
t
; 0  t <1).
As usual it is supposed that the process  is dened in some probability
space (
;F ;P) and that it is measurable regarding the ow of -algebras
(F
t
; t  0), where F
t
can be considered as information on the system up to
the moment t.
As for the lifetime of the project (the duration of the existence of the new
rm), this is considered innite, although in an unstable socio-political envi-
ronment the investor is afraid that the project may cease to bring any prot
after a certain time following the investment as a result of changes in the
political or economic course of the country, and the situation will be such
that investor will have to refuse further use of the enterprise. This factor is
naturally called , and in our model it is taken into account in that the investor
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will receive revenues only within a certain period of time after making the
investment, while the duration of this interval L () is a random variable.
The tax system inuences investor behaviour signicantly. We restrict our
investigation to corporate income taxes that bring about one-quarter of all
the tax revenues of the state budget. According to current Russian laws, it is
characterised by state (federal) and territorial (regional) tax rates as well as a
set of tax benets. As can be seen from Appendix A, the majority of exemp-
tions are tax holidays, i.e. full or partial
4
exemption from regional corporate
income tax for some time after the rm is created and prot obtained. In this
paper, we will focus on tax holidays, so the tax system can be represented
as a triplet (
f
; 
r
; ), where 
f
and 
r
are, respectively, the federal and
regional corporate income tax rates and  is the duration of the tax holidays.
Suppose that investment in the project is started at moment  .
The present value of investor returns from the project can be written by the
following formula:
V

= E
0
B
@
+min(;L)
Z

(1  
f
)
t
e
 (t )
dt
+
+max(;L)
Z
+
(1  
f
  
r
)
t
e
 (t )
dt







F

1
C
A
; (1)
where  is the investor discount rate, L is the lifetime of the revenues for
the investor, and the notation E(jF

) stands for the conditional expectation
provided by information about the system until moment  .
The purpose of the investor is to nd a moment for investment (the rule of
investing) which depends on previous (but not future) observations of the
environment, so that its net present value (NPV) will be maximal within the
given tax system, i.e:
E (V

  I) e
 
! max

; (2)
where E = E(jF
0
) is the sign of the expectation (provided the known data
about the system at moment t = 0), and the maximum is considered over
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all the \investment rules", i.e.  , depending only on the observations of the
environment (among them the virtual prot from the project), up to this
point (the Markovian moment, i.e. such that an event f  tg belongs to
-algebra F
t
for all t).
At the same time, we can calculate the tax payments into the budget that
can be made by the project after investment. These tax revenues depend on
the behaviour of the rm after period L when investor income revenues end.
One of the possible assumptions (that we are going to explore further) is that,
although after an interval of length L a certain event happens, say expropri-
ation, the rm itself continues to work without any change in performance
and to pay taxes. In this case, the expected tax payments from the rm into
, discounted to moment  , are equal to:
T
f

= E
0
@
1
Z


f

t
e
 (t )
dt






F

1
A
; (3)
and into the {
T
r

= E
0
@
1
Z
+

r

t
e
 (t )
dt






F

1
A
; (4)
where  is the budget discount rate (that compares the values of the budget
revenues in time), which can, in general, be dierent from the discount .
The other possible assumption is that, after the period L, the rm ceases to
function and to pay taxes. In this case, the expected tax payments into the
federal and regional budgets, discounted to the moment of investment, are
described by the formulas:
e
T
f

= E
0
@
+L
Z


f

t
e
 (t )
dt
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1
A
; (3
0
)
e
T
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= E
0
B
@
+max(;L)
Z
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r

t
e
 (t )
dt







F

1
C
A
: (4
0
)
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Of course, there exists the intermediate case (which may be the most re-
alistic one), where expropriation (after period L) changes the prots from
the rm (e.g. reduces it) without terminating its activity. In this case, the
corresponding expected tax payments can be written as:
e
e
T
f

= E
0
@
+L
Z


f

t
e
 (t )
dt+
1
Z
+L

f
e
t
e
 (t )
dt
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A
; (3
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dt+
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t
e
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dt







F

1
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;
(4
00
)
where e
t
is the process of the rm's prots after expropriation.
3. MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
As was noted above, L is considered as a random variable. We will assume
that it does not depend on the ow of project revenues and that it has an
exponential distribution with the parameter , i.e. it has a density p(L) =
e
 L
. Parameter  can be interpreted as the rate of a \political risk", since
it characterises the probability of a \catastrophe" (that there are no investor
revenues) within a small interval of time, under the condition that it never
occurred in the past, i.e. Pft < L < t + dt jL > tg = dt. Note that if
 = 0, then the lifetime of investor revenues becomes innite (there is no
political risk).
I is constant in time. Such an assumption does not restrict general consid-
erations, and, for example, the case of exponential growth of investment (in
time) can be reduced to the \constant case" with a simple shift of parameters.
In McDonald and Siegel (1986), an even more general case was considered
where I evolved according to geometric Brownian motion, but this does not
lead to a totally new pattern, it only makes the formulas more complicated.
is described by the stochastic process  = (
t
; t  0). In order to specify it,
let us dene R(t;t) =

t+t
  
t

t
{ the rate of prots growth at interval
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(t; t + t). We will consider the process  which satises the following
assumptions:
(P1) R(t;t) does not depend on F
t
{ \the past" of the system until
moment t;
(P2) distribution of R(t;t) does not depend on moment t;
(P3) almost all trajectories 
t
are positive and continuous in t.
The conditions described here reect some \extreme" properties of the environ-
ment in which the project exists. For example, (P1) means that the rates of
growth of prots can not be predicted for certain on the basis of \the past",
and (P2) { that they are regular stochastically. Condition (P3) is the most
restrictive and selects projects, which provide positive prots immediately
after investment.
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These conditions do seem extremely strong, but it turned out that they de-
termine the stochastic process of prots  in a particular way, standard for
nancial models.
Proposition 1. (
t
; t  0)
d
t
= 
t
(dt+  dw
t
); (5)

t
= 
0
expf( 

2
2
)t + w
t
g: (6)

0
  0w
t
Proof. Dene the random process X
t
as follows: X
t
= log

t

0
; t  0.
Since X
t+t
  X
t
= log

t+t

t
= log (1 + R(t;t)), then by virtue of the
properties (P1){(P3) the process (X
t
; t  0) is a continuous homogeneous
process with independent increments and the initial point X
0
= 0. Thus, the
known results on the representation of continuous random processes (see,
for example, Gikhman and Skorokhod (1977), pp.240,34) imply that X
t
is
a linear function of the Wiener process, i.e. X
t
= at + bw
t
, when a; b are
real (b in general is non-negative, because of the symmetry of the Wiener
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process). Hence we get equation (6), while the equivalence of (5) and (6)
follows directly from the Ito formula (see Gikhman and Skorokhod (1977)).
Q.E.D.
The parameters of the geometric Brownian motion  and  have a natural
economic interpretation, namely:
 = lim
t!0
1
t
ER(t;t) is an expected instantaneous rate of prots
growth;

2
= lim
t!0
1
t
DR(t;t) is an instantaneous variance of rate of prots
growth (volatility of the project).
We should emphasise that the rate of growth in prots does not have to be
positive. Negative  means that the prots ow decreases with time (on
average), while nevertheless remaining positive; and when  = 0, it changes
around its mean 
0
.
The process of geometric Brownian motion was introduced for the rst time,
probably, by P. Samuelson (Samuelson (1965)), who called it \an economic
Brownian motion" and considered it as the most appropriate way of describing
the evolution of prices in the economy. The hypothesis of geometric Brownian
motion is also the basis of the modern description of securities prices in the
nancial markets. In particular, it lies in the foundations of the well-known
option pricing theory (Black and Scholes (1973)).
Now we can write explicit formulas for the investor's Present Value (1) and for
tax payments into the budgets. Using the known formula Ee
h
= e
h
2
D=2
for the Gaussian random variable  with mean zero and variance D, the
equation (6) for geometric Brownian motion implies:
E(
t
j F

) = 

e
( 

2
2
)(t )
E expf(w
t
 w

)g = 

e
(t )
; t  : (7)
Applying the Fubini Theorem, we have:
V

=
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+L
Z

(1  
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)E(
t
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)e
 (t )
p(L) dt dL
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  
; where  =  + ; b = 
f
+ 
r
e
 ( )
: (8)
The two last lines in these equations show that  =  +  can be viewed
as of the investor, and  as the \political risk premium" (on the problem of
measuring the eect of political risk, see also Clark (1997)).
Analogously, we can obtain explicit formulas for the expected tax payments
into the federal and the regional budgets (3) and (4):
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Tf

=
1
Z


f
e
 (t )
E(
t
jF

) dt = 
f


1
Z

e
 ( )(t )
dt
=

f


   
; (9)
T
r

=
1
Z
+

r
e
 (t )
E(
t
jF

) dt = 
r


1
Z
+
e
 ( )(t )
dt
=

r


   
e
 ( )
: (10)
For the other variants of tax payments (3
0
) and (4
0
) one can also easily obtain:
e
T
f

=
1
Z
0
+L
Z


f
e
 (t )
E(
t
jF

)p(L) dt dL
= 
f


1
Z
0
+L
Z

e
 ( )(t )
dtp(L) dL =

f


   
1
Z
0

1  e
 ( )L

 p(L) dL =

f


   

1 

 +    

=

f


 +    
;
e
T
r

=
1
Z

+L
Z
+

r
e
 (t )
E(
t
jF

)p(L) dt dL = 
r


1
Z

L
Z

e
 ( )t
dt
 p(L) dL =

r


   
e
 ( )
1
Z
0

1  e
 ( )(L )

p(L+ ) dL
=

r


 +    
e
 (+ )
:
From these relationships, one can see that the case when the rm ceases to
function after the investor stops receiving incomes can be reduced (from the
point of view of total tax payments into the budgets) to the situation when
the rm continues functioning with an adjusted budget discount 
0
=  + .
For this reason, we will consider the rst case as the main one.
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4. INVESTIGATION OF THE BASIC MODEL
In this Section we provide a solution for the model formulated above. As it
turned out, it can be obtained in an explicit (analytical) form. On the basis
of the obtained formulas, we provide a theoretical analysis of the model.
4.1. SOLUTION OF THE INVESTOR PROBLEM
The problem which the investor faces is an optimal stopping problem for the
stochastic process. The relevant theory is well developed (see, for example,
Shiryaev (1969)), but there are very few problems which have a solution in
an explicit form, and problem (2) belongs to this type.
Let () be a positive root of the quadratic equation:
1
2

2
(   1) +     = 0: (11)
We should point out that () > 1 whenever  > . If  > 0, then,
obviously:
() =
1
2
 


2
+
s



2
 
1
2

2
+
2

2
:
If  = 0, then () = = whenever  > 0, and there is no positive root
of the equation (11) whenever   0, but we nd it convenient to consider
() =1.
We will denote  = ();
~
 = ().
Theorem 1.  > 


= minft  0 : 
t
 

g
6
(12)


= kI
 +    
1  b
; k =

   1
; b = 
f
+ 
r
e
 (+ )
(The proof of this theorem, as well as of Theorem 2 below, is contained in
Appendix B.)
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Theorem 1 shows that the optimal moment for the investment begins when
virtual prot achieves a critical level 

. Formulas of this type (for the case
of geometric Brownian motion) are given in McDonald and Siegel (1986) and
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (for a more simple model of the investor), and
probably follow from the results McKean (1965) and Merton (1973) obtained
in option pricing theory.
One can look at equality (12) from the investor's point of view (see formula
(8)), namely, the optimal moment for the investment 

coincides with the
moment when the investor's Present Value V

achieves threshold level kI.
This means that the classical investment rule { V

I does not work any longer
for this model, since the investments can be postponed, and it should be
modied in the following way: k =

   1
k > 1. Detailed analysis of this
phenomenon and its connections with the known Jorgenson rules and Tobin's
ratio q can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
In order to avoid the trivial moment of investment 

= 0, we will further
suppose that the initial value of the prot 
0
satises 
0
< 

.
If we know the optimal moment for the investment, we can nd the ex-
pected optimal income for the investor as well as the relevant expected tax
payments from the project into the federal and regional budgets. Let us
denote the discounted net income of the investor under the condition of op-
timal behaviour, i.e. the maximum value of the function in (2)), as V, let
T
f
= E

T
f


e
 


be the discounted tax payments into the federal budget
under optimal behaviour, and T
r
be the similar value for the tax payments
into the regional budget.
We should point out that the optimal moment of investment 

is not always
nite, i.e. the project can remain non-invested. Let us dene P

= Pf

<
1g as the probability of investing in the project (at some nite moment of
time).
If the project will be invested in, then E

which characterises investment
activity (with regard to the project), i.e. the time possibilities of the investor's
entry into the system, is also interesting for study.
Theorem 2. minf; g > 
V= (k   1)I


0




T
f
=

f

0
   


0



~
 1
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Tr
=

r

0
   


0



~
 1
e
 ( )
P

= 1 
1
2

2
P

=


0



1 2=
2
 <
1
2

2
E

=
1
  
2
=2
log



0
 >
1
2

2
E

=1 
1
2

2


~
 = ()
From that one can see that, in any case (with probability one) only \strong
protable" projects (the parameters of which are connected by the relation
 
1
2

2
) will be invested in. In particular, for the deterministic case ( = 0)
those will be all the projects with   0. At the same time, the other projects
(including all those with negative ) will stay, with a positive probability,
without investment (at any moment of time).
4.2. INFLUENCE OF TAX HOLIDAYS
At this point, we will examine how tax policy can inuence investor and tax
payments into the federal and regional budgets.
As relative it is natural to compare the ratio of the optimal investor's NPV
(or, tax payments into budgets, respectively) under tax holidays to the cor-
responding income without tax holidays.
In this Section, we will use the following notation 

(); 

();V() etc.
in order to highlight the dependence of the optimal moment and level of
investment, investor's income, and the other indicators mentioned above on
the duration of tax holidays .
With the help of explicit formulas from Theorem 2, we can obtain the follow-
ing expressions for such estimates:
E
i
=
V()
V(0)
= 

(investor); (13)
E
f
=
T
f
()
T
f
(0)
= 
~
 1
(federal budget); (14)
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Er
=
T
r
()
T
r
(0)
= 
~
 1
e
 ( )
(regional budget); (15)
where  =
1  b()
1   b(0)
=
1  
f
  
r
e
 ( )
1  
f
  
r
, and ,
~
 were dened as at
the beginning of Section 4.1. (16)
If  > 
2
=2 then the expected speed-up of investment in circumstances of
tax holidays, in comparison with the case when they are absent, is expressed
by the formula:
 = E [

(0)  

()] =
log 
  
2
=2
; (17)
where  is dened as in (16).
An important feature of the obtained estimates (13){(17) is that they on the
initial data of the project (the amount of the required investment I and the
initial value of virtual prot 
0
), and are determined only by the parameters of
the project (; ), the discount rates of the investor and environment ; ; ,
and the tax holidays .
One can see from the formulas in Theorems 1 and 2 that, when tax holidays 
increase, the critical level 

decreases, and the value of the discounted tax
payments into the federal budget increases. Moreover, the optimal moment
of investment 

will decrease (and with a probability of one) where the
stochastic process of prots  = (
t
(!); t  0; ! 2 
). This implies that
(non-expected) discounted tax payments from the project into the federal
budget T
f
!
() =
1
Z


()

f

t
(!)e
 t
dt increases in  for all random events
! 2 
. As for discounted tax payments into the regional budget T
r
!
() =
1
Z


()+

r

t
(!)e
 t
dt, the region will have , i.e. T
r
!
() > T
r
!
(0), only in
such cases where 

() +  < 

(0). The probability P
r
of such an event
can be estimated as follows.
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Using equation (6) for geometric Brownian motion (
t
; t  0) with param-
eters (; ) and an independence of Wiener increments, one can show the
following formula for any Markovian moment  :

+t
= 

expf( 
1
2

2
)t+(w
+t
 w

)g = 

expf( 
1
2

2
)t+ ~w
t
g; t  0;
where ( ~w
t
; t  0) is Wiener process independent of 

.
Applying this, we can get:
P
r
= Pf

() +  < 

(0)g = Pf max
0t

()+

t
< 

(0)g
= Pf max


()t

()+

t
< 

(0)g = EPf max
0t



()+t
< 

(0)





()
g
= EPfmax
0t



()
expf( 
1
2

2
)t +  ~w
t
g < 

(0)





()
g
= P

max
0t
[( 
1
2

2
)t +  ~w
t
] < log


(0)


()

;
log


(0)


()
= log
1  b()
1  b(0)
= log :
Now, using the known formula for the distribution of the maximum of the
Wiener process with linear drift (see, for example, Shiryaev et al (1994)):
Pf max
0tT
(w
t
+ at)  xg = (x
 
)   expf
1
2
(x
2
+
  x
2
 
)g( x
+
);
where x

=
x aT

p
T
; (x) = (2)
 1=2
and
x
Z
 1
e
 y
2
=2
dy is the Gaussian
distribution function, we get for positive  and :
P
r
= (
 
)  
2=
2
 1
( 
+
); (18)
where 

=

log   ( 

2
2
)


(
p
) .
Let us point out that this probability also does not depend on the initial data
of the project (
0
and I). Some examples of the magnitude of this probability
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will be given below in Section 5.1.
4.3. COMPARATIVE STATICS: DEPENDENCE ON
UNCERTAINTY, RISK, AND TAX EXEMPTIONS
In this Section, we will point out the general type of dependence of the
main economic indicators of the model on the parameters of the project
and its environment. Let us emphasise the parameters connected with the
uncertainty, risk and tax exemptions (i.e. the volatility of the project , the
rate of the political risk , and the tax holidays ).
7
Table 1 describes the qualitative behaviour of the economic indicators (13){
(17) as functions of ;  and . Here, arrows indicate monotonicity (in the
corresponding direction), sign _ means the presence of the maximum (tran-
sition from increase to decrease), and sign  means that the qualitative
behaviour does not have a denite character and can vary depending on the
composition of the input parameters.
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Table 1. Behaviour of the main indicators as functions of volatility, political risk and tax
holidays
Indicators Volatility Political risk Tax holidays
  
Investment level, 

% % &
Probability of investment, P

& & %
Exp.time of invest.waiting, E

% % &
Investor NPV,V  & %
Federal tax payments,T
f
 & %
Regional tax payments,T
r
 & either &, or _
Inuence of tax holidays on:
{ investor NPV, E
i
& % %
{ federal budget, E
f
& % %
{ regional budget, E
r
& % either &, or _
Expected speed-up,  % % %
As one can see from the table, if the volatility of the project  increases,
the probability of investment (if  <
1
2

2
) falls and the expected time of
investment waiting (if  >
1
2

2
) rises, if that were not obvious intuitively.
The inuence of tax holidays on investors and tax payments into the budgets
(in a relative sense) decreases and, as calculations in the next section show,
this decrease can be very signicant.
When the political risk  is higher, the investment level 

also increases.
Therefore, the moment of investment 

is delayed of the prot process
(unlike the previous case of change in the parameter , when the process
itself changed). The later entry of the investor leads to a decrease in net
discounted income and to a decrease in tax payments into the budgets but,
at the same time, tax holidays become more eective (they increase relative
gain).
Hence, the relative inuence of tax holidays increases with an increase in
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political risk (though the relative income of the investor and tax payments are
decreased) and decreases in volatility of the project. Concerning dependence
on tax holidays, we should note that almost all our inferences are consistent
with the intuitive notions. We next turn our attention to the non-monotonic
behaviour of the regional tax payments T
r
(and the corresponding regional
estimate E
r
) in tax holidays. From Theorem 2 we have the following formula:
T
r
() =

r

0
   


0
k(  )I

~
 1
u();
where u() = e
 ( )
(1  b)
~
 1
;  =  + . Then
u
0
() =  (   )e
 ( )
(1  b)
~
 1
+ (
~
   1)e
 ( )
(1   b)
~
 2
 
r
(   )e
 ( )
= (1  b)
~
 2
e
 ( )

h
(
~
   1)
r
(   )e
 ( )
  (   )(1  b)
i
= (1  b())
~
 2
(   )e
 ( )


r
e
 ( )

(
~
   1)
  
   
+ 1

  1 + 
f

:
Now it is easy to see that, if
~
  1 +
1  
f
  
r

r

   
  
;
then u
0
()  0 for all   0, but if the opposite inequality
~
 > 1 +
1  
f
  
r

r

   
  
; (19)
holds, then regional tax payments have a unique maximum at the point


=
1
  
log


r
1  
f

1 + (
~
   1)
  
   

: (20)
Such \optimal" tax holidays 

are able to bring to the region maximum of
discounted tax payments from projects (in income tax). We will investigate
in detail these tax holidays in the next Section.
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4.4. COMPARISON OF THE INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT
FACTORS ON INVESTMENT ACTIVITY
In this Section we will try to compare the inuence of the parameters of the
economic environment { discount , political risk , tax rates for the federal
and regional budgets 
f
¨ 
r
, as well as tax holidays  { on investor behaviour
(investment activity).
In line with Theorem 1, we can characterise an investment activity by an
optimal threshold 

such that, when virtual prot reaches it, a decision on
investment is adopted. The explicit expression in (12) shows dependence


on the factors of the economic environment while the parameters of the
project (; ) have a signicantly complicated and non-linear character.
Let us calculate the partial derivatives of the function:


= 

(; ; 
f
; 
r
; ) = I 

   1

+    
1  b
;
where b = 
f
+ 
r
e
 (+ )
and  = () is as dened at the beginning
of Section 4.1. We have:
@

@
f
= I

   1

 +    
(1  b)
2
=


1  b
; (21)
@

@
r
=


1  b
e
 (+ )
; (22)
@

@
=  


1  b

r
( +    )e
 (+ )
; (23)
@

@
= I

   1

1  b   ( +    )
r
e
 (+ )
(1  b)
2
=


1  b

1  b
 +    
  
r
e
 (+ )

; (24)
@

@
=  
I
(   1)
2
+    
1  b
@
@
+ I

   1

1  b   ( +    )
r
e
 (+ )
(1  b)
2
=  


(   1)
@
@
+
@

@
:
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Dierentiating both parts of the quadratic equation (11) by  we have:
@
@
=
1

2
(   1=2) + 
:
For this reason:
@

@
=


1  b

1  b
 +    
 
1  b
(   1)[
2
(   1=2) + ]
  
r
e
 (+ )

:
(25)
We should ensure that all derivatives in formulas (22)-(25) are expressed
through the derivative by the federal tax rate 
f
(21). For this reason,
in a comparison of the derivatives, it is sucient to consider the following
expressions:
D
r
=
@

@
r

@

@
f
; D

=
@

@

@

@
f
;
D

=
@

@

@

@
f
; D

=
@

@

@

@
f
:
These ratios of partial derivatives of the investment threshold 

can be con-
sidered as marginal estimates of the inuence of dierent factors on investor
activity. They show what changes in the dierent parameters cause the same
changes in the function 

. Indeed, if we wish to compare the federal and
the regional tax rates, let us consider the following relationships:


(
f
+
f
; 
r
)  

(
f
; 
r
) +
@

@
f

f
;


(
f
; 
r
+
r
)  

(
f
; 
r
) +
@

@
r

r
(other arguments in 

are omitted). Hence, the increment 
r
causes the
same change in 

(under the xed other arguments) as the increment 
f
provided that they are related by the equation:

r
= (1=D
r
)
f
: (26)
Similarly, one can derive the following relationships for increments in argu-
ments that cause the same increments in 

:
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 = (1=D

)
f
;  = (D

=D

);  = (D

=D

): (27)
We should point out that always D
r
< 1; D

< D

. The typical magni-
tudes of values D

; D

, etc. are given in Table 2. The calculations there are
made for tax rates equalling 
f
= 13%; 
r
= 22%, variants of tax holidays
( = 0; 3; 5 years) which are typical for the Russian regions, as well as dis-
count  = 20% (per year) and projects with parameters  = 0;  = 0:04 (all
data are on annual basis). Note that, as one can see from equation (27), D
r
has a non-dimensional value, while the units of measurement for other values
are: for D

; D

, and
 1
for D

.
Table 2
Polit.risk Discount Region.tax Tax holidays
 D

D

D
r
D

( = 0)
0 3.25 3.15 1 -0.044
3 3.38 3.27 0.55 -0.024
5 3.54 3.42 0.37 -0.016
( = 0:02)
0 2.95 2.85 1 -0.048
3 3.10 2.98 0.52 -0.025
5 3.26 3.13 0.33 -0.016
Note that negative D

means that eective increases in tax rates is equivalent
to decreases in tax holidays, and vice versa.
The results of the calculations in Table 2 are robust enough with respect to
changes in the parameters of the model (within \reasonable" values). So,
this table, together with equations (26){(27), allow us to make the following
conclusions concerning the marginal inuence of dierent factors on investor
activity.
1) The political risk parameter  and discount  have an almost equal inuence
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on the investor (the inuence of  is a little bit stronger).
2) If the existing tax holidays are 3 5 years, an increment in the federal tax
rate of 1% causes the same changes in investment activity as an increment
in the regional tax rate of 2  3%. If there are no tax holidays, both rates
are equivalent from the investor's point of view. An increase in tax holidays
of 1 year is equivalent to a decrease in the federal tax rate of approximately
1:5  2:5% (for 3- or 5-year tax holidays) and by 4  5% (if there are no
holidays).
3) Comparing political risk and tax holidays, we can say that a decrease in
political risk of 1% causes the same changes in investment activity as an in-
crease in tax holidays of 1:52 years (for typical tax holidays), or of 0:60:7
years (without tax holidays).
Until now we have been comparing dierent factors, or equivalently, the \com-
pensation" of changes in one factor by another in the marginal sense, i.e. by
small changes in parameters.
Let us look at the problem of compensation from the other side.
Suppose that an investor who follows the optimal behaviour strategy described
in Section 2, faces a dilemma: investing in a \risky" economy, that provides
signicant tax holidays; or going to a \no-risk" economy, and not to have any
tax exemptions (or only minimal ones). An investor can face such a problem
even when choosing a region for the realisation of the project. There appears
a question: which tax exemptions can compensate (from the point of view of
investor entry) the political risk factors? We should point out that we mean
here signicant changes in parameters, not small ones as above.
As we have already pointed out, the activity of the investor within the frame-
work of our model is characterised by the critical level for investment 

(see
Theorem 1). Furthermore, (until the end of this Section) we will write also


= 

(; ) in order to emphasise its dependence on the factors of political
risk  and tax holidays .
We will say that tax holidays 

political risk if they do not change the
optimal level of investment in comparison with the no-risk case, i.e.:


(; 

) = 

(0; 
0
); (28)
where 
0
is the tax holidays existing in the no-risk case (in particular, 
0
can
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be equal to zero, i.e. without risk there are no exemptions).
Assuming (for the sake of simplicity) that the parameters of the project, tax
rates and discount are the same in both the risk and no-risk cases, from the
explicit form for 

(Theorem 1) one can easily see that (28) is equivalent to
the following:
1  
f
  
r
e
 (+ )

=

1 +

   


1  
f
  
r
e
 ( )
0

;
or:
e
 (+ )

= e
 ( )
0
 

   

1  
f

r
  e
 ( )
0

: (29)
In order to satisfy equation (29) with some 

, the following condition must
be valid:
   

>
1  
f

r
e
( )
0
  1 >
1  
f
  
r

r
:
Hence, if  > 
r
( )=(1 
f
 
r
)  0:34( ) under existing tax rates
in Russia, then (29) can not be valid for any 

.
It means that there is a \critical" value of political risk 

such that, if political
risk is greater than this value, it (in the sense of (28)) by any tax holidays.
This \critical" value is equal to:
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= (   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)e
( 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r
i
In particular, if there are no exemptions (
0
= 0) in a \no-risk" economy,
then 

 0:34(   ) (approximately 0:05  0:06 per year), and, in the
general case, it depends on 
0
.
The formula for the compensating tax holidays 

is the following:
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:
The typical pattern of their behaviour (for the case 
0
= 0) is given by Figure
1.
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Figure 1. Dependence of the compensating tax holidays on political risk
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5. PRINCIPLES OF THE DETERMINATION OF TAX
HOLIDAYS
In previous Sections, the investment project was considered from the point
of view of the investor. Now, let us look at it from another point of view |
that of regional interests. Here, we will view the basic model from Section 2
as a model of investor behaviour from the point of view of the region.
As was noted previously, the creation of a new enterprise in the region asso-
ciated with the appearance of a new taxpayer leads to an increase in employ-
ment, but it can also bring a number of new problems (for example, ecological
ones). So, the consequences of the appearance of the investor in the region
can be very dierent. A region can have its \own" projects in which it is very
interested and ready to provide signicant tax exemptions with the purpose
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of winning investment competitions held, for example, by the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. At the same time, the investor who
has a project for enterprise creation can choose a region for its realisation,
taking into account many factors, including tax exemptions.
For these reasons, it is interesting to explore and compare dierent principles
of the determination of tax holidays.
Here, we will analyse three principles of the determination of tax holidays.
The rst is the principle of the optimisation of tax payments with the help
of tax holidays of appropriate duration. The other two are those principles
that exist in reality | xed tax holidays, and tax holidays during the payback
period.
The basis of our consideration is the model from Section 2, i.e. the hypoth-
esis of the optimal behaviour of the investor. If one knows the behaviour of
the investor under any duration of tax holidays, the region can estimate the
consequences of investor entry in addition to, in particular, tax payments into
the regional budget. The above-mentioned optimisation approach gives also
the possibility of evaluating the eectiveness of existing tax holidays.
5.1. OPTIMISATION APPROACH
As was shown in Section 4.3, discounted tax payments from the project into
the regional budget T
r
are maximal (over all tax holidays ) at the point  =


. This \optimal" point has an explicit form (20) when conditions (19) are
satised, and when this condition does not hold it is equal to zero. Such tax
holidays 

can be viewed as the \best" exemptions from the regional point
of view (namely, tax payments into the regional budget from the project).
Naturally, the region can have other motives for the attraction of the investor
other than the purely scal (such as improvements in infrastructure, increase
in employment, etc.). However, we will consider the concept of optimal tax
holidays as a useful theoretical tool that makes it possible to compare and
analyse the actual principles of the determination of tax holidays.
For this reason, we begin with a more detailed investigation of optimal tax
holidays.
The set of parametersD = f(; )g, for which condition (19) holds, looks like
the domain in Figure 2. From here, one can see that non-trivial tax holidays
should be set only for projects for which prots have both a suciently small
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Figure 2. Set of mutual benets
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expected growth rate and low volatility. In other words, for the region it
does not make sense to provide tax exemptions either for projects with a high
prots growth rate (large ), or for those with high volatility (large ).
If the prots from the project are deterministic ( = 0), then
~
 = = and
condition (19) transforms to the following:
    > 
1  
f
  
r

r
:
Thus, the critical growth rate for non-zero tax holidays is equal to ^ =

r
1  
f
( + ) which, under the current Russian laws (
f
= 13%; 
r
=
22%), is about one quarter (0:253) of the investor discount rate including
political risk. It means, in particular, that the existence of non-trivial tax
holidays which maximise discounted tax payments is not obvious, even in the
deterministic case, since it requires certain conditions.
From the formulas in Theorem 2, one can see that the valuesV, T
f
increase
in , andT
r
increase (in ) if 0    

and decrease if  > 

. Therefore,
the set D (dened by equation (19)), in which there are non-zero optimal tax
holidays, can be termed . It means that, if project parameters are located in
this set, an increase in tax holidays from 0 as far as the optimal level 

is
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mutually benecial for all participants because it increases both the expected
discounted net income of the investor and the expected tax payments into
both the regional and the federal budgets.
Let us demonstrate now the eectiveness of the mechanism of tax holidays
with some numeric examples. As reasonable sets of the parameter values, we
will consider    2%  3%;   0  0:1; discount rates  10  25%
(annual).
8
Table 3 shows the dependence of the estimates of the eectiveness of the
participants (E
f
; E
r
; E
i
) and the expected speed-up in investment ( , in
years) on the expected growth rate in prots (). Also given are the values
of optimal tax holidays (

, in years) and the probability of the real advan-
tage of the region from them (P
r
). The volatility of the project is taken as
 = 0:04 (in this case, non-zero optimal tax holidays will be if  < 4:8%),
all discount rates are equal to 20%, and political risk is absent ( = 0).
Table 3. Dependence on expected growth rate
Exp.rate Fed.budget Reg.budget Investor Speed-up Holidays Probab.
 E
f
E
r
E
i
 

P
r
1% 7.27 2.59 8.85 6.74 5.42
2% 2.89 1.45 3.38 5.32 3.81 0.77
3% 1.67 1.12 1.86 3.62 2.35 0.62
A decrease in the eectiveness of tax holidays in  means (in some sense)
that a high rate of prots growth is a better stimulus for the investor than
tax exemptions.
The next table illustrates the dependence of the same indicators on volatility
. Expected growth rate is equal to 3%, discounts { 20%, and political risk
is absent (non-zero tax holidays will be in this case if  < 0:118).
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Table 4. Dependence on volatility
Volatility Fed.budget Reg.budget Investor Speed-up Holidays Probab.
 E
f
E
r
E
i
 

P
r
0 2.08 1.23 2.36 4.23 3.07 1
0.02 1.95 1.19 2.20 4.11 2.86 0.82
0.04 1.67 1.12 1.86 3.62 2.35 0.62
0.06 1.42 1.06 1.54 2.92 1.72 0.49
0.08 1.23 1.02 1.30 2.07 1.09 0.40
0.10 1.09 1.01 1.12 1.08 0.49 0.26
From this table it follows that the eectiveness of tax exemptions decreases
if uncertainty (volatility) increases for all participants of the model. For the
investor, it has to do with the fact that, if the project's prots are too volatile
(and random oscillations can be both positive and negative), tax exemptions
are no longer attractive (when volatility is too high, the project is outside the
set of mutual benets D and there is no tax exemptions at all).
Table 5 demonstrates the dependence of the above-mentioned indicators of
eectiveness both on the discount rates and political risk. Here, a project
with \average" parameters  = 3%;  = 0:06 is considered.
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Table 5. Dependence on political risk and discounts
Political risk Fed.budget Reg.budget Investor Speed-up Holidays Probab.
 (years
 1
) E
f
E
r
E
i
 

P
r
( = 15%,  = 20%)
0 1.03 1.00 1.03 0.24 0.17 0.18
0.02 1.20 1.02 1.20 1.52 0.99 0.37
0.04 1.35 1.05 1.35 2.51 1.52 0.46
0.06 1.49 1.08 1.48 3.29 1.89 0.52
0.08 1.61 1.12 1.59 3.94 2.13 0.57
( = 20%,  = 20%)
0 1.42 1.06 1.54 2.92 1.72 0.49
0.02 1.55 1.10 1.72 3.63 2.02 0.55
0.04 1.67 1.14 1.88 4.22 2.23 0.60
0.06 1.77 1.18 2.02 4.71 2.37 0.64
0.08 1.86 1.23 2.15 5.13 2.46 0.68
( = 20%,  = 25%)
0 1.48 1.06 1.48 2.61 1.51 0.48
0.02 1.65 1.11 1.65 3.35 1.82 0.56
0.04 1.81 1.15 1.81 3.96 2.05 0.60
0.06 1.96 1.21 1.95 4.47 2.20 0.64
0.08 2.09 1.26 2.08 5.91 2.31 0.68
As one can see from the calculations, the additional benets from the intro-
duction of optimal tax holidays can be quite signicant, and achieved with
the help of relatively short tax holidays (3 4 years, which is appropriate for
some Russian regions). At the same time, it turns out that when the region
tries to achieve the highest scal gain, it provides favours (in the sense of
a relative gain) to the investor and to the federal budget. But, as we have
already mentioned, the region may have non-tax benets from the project.
The sensitivity of the region's revenues to a change in both project parame-
ters and political risk is also less than those for the investor and the region.
As for the expected speed-up in investment, it can also be signicant and
achieve 4 5 years.
From this table, one can see that the mechanism of optimal tax exemptions
becomes more eective (for all participants) in unstable systems with high
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levels of political risk. For example, if  = 0:08, the eectiveness of optimal
tax holidays increases by 1020% (for the regional budget) and by 3050%
(for the investor and the federal budget) in comparison with the absence of
the political risk ( = 0).
Let us focus on the fact that, in almost all considered examples, the probability
of the real tax advantage of the region P
r
turns out to be rather high. It
is 50  60% (on average), and it is less sensitive to the value of political
risk in comparison with the sensitivity to a change in the project parameters
(expected rate of income growth and volatility). This means that in only
approximately half of the cases can the region obtain real tax advantages
from an investor when it uses optimal tax holidays as a tax stimulus.
The region can set the goal of nding such tax holidays under which the prob-
ability P
r
would be maximal. But this approach is not suciently eective
since it does not lead to an essential increase in the probability of real tax
advantages for regions in comparison with the same probability under optimal
tax holidays. For example, for the data in Tables 4 and 5, the increase in
probability does not exceed 10% and it decreases with the growth in probabil-
ity. This fact allows us to say that optimal tax holidays, besides maximising
tax payments (into the regional budget), \almost" maximises the probability
of real tax advantages for the region.
We now turn our attention to the non-monotonic behaviour of the duration
of optimal tax holidays in political risk. Indeed, according to (20) one can
write:

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=
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   1
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x
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

r
1  
f
(1 + x)

; where x =
~
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Let x

be a root of the equation:
log


r
1  
f
(1 + x)

=
x
1 + x
;
and 

=   +  + x

(   )=(
~
   1). Then if   

the value of tax
holidays 

increases, and if  > 

, it decreases.
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Figure 3. Dependence of optimal tax holidays on political risk
-
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Thus tax holidays (optimal from the regional point of view) always remain
bounded; after certain \critical" levels of political risk 

are achieved, they
lose their \eectiveness" and should be decreased (Figure 3 shows several
patterns of optimal tax holidays as a function of political risk for dierent
projects for the discounts  = 20%;  = 25% { see also Table 5).
5.2. THE PAYBACK PERIOD APPROACH (NOVGOROD
SCHEME)
As was mentioned in the Introduction, in some regions of Russia the period
until the break-even point is reached (the payback period) is accepted as
the duration of tax holidays. During the realisation of an investment project
directed to the creation of a new production process, or the reconstruction
or modernisation of an existing one, tax exemptions from regional income
tax are provided until the project breaks even. We will call this exemption
pattern the \Novgorod scheme", since it has been most clearly manifested in
the Novgorod region.
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Detailed instructions for the calculation of the payback period were prepared
(in the Novgorod region) by the consultancy rm Arthur Andersen. Ac-
cording to the accepted denitions, the payback period is determined as the
minimum time interval (starting from the moment when the opening balance
is recorded), during which time discounted expected cash ow (or prot) be-
comes equal to the initial expenditures. Depending on whether the discount
factor is used in such a ow (existing instructions do not give strict recom-
mendations on the issue), we can consider a discounted payback period, or a
non-discounted payback period.
Within the framework of our model, these denitions correspond to the fol-
lowing values:

1
{ the solution of the equation:
E


+
1
Z



t
dt = I; (31)

2
{ the solution of the equation:
E


+
2
Z



t
e
 (t 

)
dt = I: (32)
Using obtained expressions for the optimal moment of investment, one can
establish a simple relationship that makes it possible to nd values 
1
and 
2
.
Using formula (7) we have:
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(when  = 0 we will dene the latter expression as 


1
).
For this reason, from (31) it follows that:
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and, by substituting the formula for 

from Theorem 1, we obtain the equa-
tion:
k
   

(e

1
  1) = 1  
f
  
r
e
 ( )
1
; (34)
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Similarly, we can obtain:
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Thus, payback periods 
1
and 
2
can be found as the roots of equations (34)
and (35).
If  = 0, then equation (35) has the explicit solution:

2
=
1
   
log
k   
r
k   1 + 
f
:
In Table 6, we provide some numerical calculations of payback periods 
1
¨

2
and compare them with \optimal" tax holidays 

both in duration and
eectiveness (here eectiveness E() of tax holidays  is dened as the ratio
of the tax payments into the regional budget under holidays  to those tax
payments under optimal holidays 

). We divide all investment projects into
three groups depending on their volatility: with high ( = 0:10), moderate
( = 0:04), and low ( = 0:01) volatilities. We assume also  = 20%;  = 0.
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Table 6. Eectiveness of payback periods for groups of projects
 
1
E(
1
) 
2
E(
2
) 

( = 0:10)
-3% 3.1 0.955 5.8 0.947 4.3
-2% 3.2 0.986 5.8 0.918 3.9
-1% 3.2 0.999 5.8 0.884 3.4
0% 3.2 0.995 5.7 0.847 2.7
1% 3.2 0.974 5.6 0.808 2.1
2% 3.2 0.939 5.5 0.770 1.3
3% 3.2 0.896 5.4 0.733 0.5
( = 0:04)
-3% 3.4 0.071 7.2 0.678 10.5
-2% 3.5 0.185 7.4 0.846 9.7
-1% 3.6 0.408 7.4 0.967 8.6
0% 3.6 0.707 7.3 0.999 7.1
1% 3.6 0.924 7.1 0.953 5.4
2% 3.5 0.998 6.7 0.880 3.8
3% 3.5 0.980 6.4 0.810 2.4
( = 0:01)
-1% 3.7 0.000 8.4 0.002 19.1
0% 3.8 0.008 8.5 0.417 13.8
1% 3.7 0.598 7.9 0.999 8.1
1.5% 3.7 0.848 7.5 0.977 6.4
2% 3.6 0.961 7.2 0.929 5.0
3% 3.6 0.995 6.7 0.838 3.0
The analysis of the obtained results makes it possible to come to the following
conclusions:
1) The non-discounted payback period 
1
shows signicant robustness to the
parameters of the project, and changes very insignicantly within 3{4 years.
The discounted payback period 
2
is also robust, and is greater than 
1
by a
factor of two.
2) Values 
1
and 
2
decrease both with an increase in the expected rate
of growth of income from the project (such is intuitively obvious) and any
decrease in the volatility of the project (uncertainty).
44
3) As for comparison with the optimal tax holiday 

(from the point of
view of the region), it is impossible to prefer any of the payback period vari-
ants (with discount or without it). When the growth rate or the volatility
of the project is low enough, the discounted payback period 
2
is closer to
the optimal both in duration and eectiveness. When the parameters of the
project  ¨  increase, optimal holidays decrease, and converge with the non-
discounted payback period 
1
. It means that any variant of the calculation of
the payback period (with discount or without it) can be used under certain
circumstances.
5.3. FIXED TAX HOLIDAYS
As was noted above, the most popular form of tax holidays in Russia is,
at present, exemption from payment of regional income tax for some xed
period (after the rst balance is obtained) for all enterprises on the territory
of the region (which full some additional conditions such as type of industry,
share of foreign capital, etc.). The duration of such exemptions is usually 3{5
years.
9
The exemptions themselves can be total, partial (for example, for 50%) or
according to some time schedule (see Table 1). Unlike the holidays considered
in the previous two Sections, these holidays do not depend on the individual
parameters of enterprises or of investment projects, although their duration
and form of organisation (type of exemption) can be changed depending
on the direction and priority of the investment projects. In the future, we
will consider total exemption from tax during such holidays, since \partial"
holidays can be recalculated into \total" holidays with shorter duration (this
will not be discussed in detail here).
The results of the calculations from Table 7 make it possible to compare such
\xed" holidays with the optimal 

. In this table, for three groups of projects
(similar to those in Table 6) we give values for optimal tax holidays 

, as well
as the indicators of eectiveness of three- and ve- year tax holidays for the
regions, i.e. the ratios of maximum tax payments into the regional budget
(under optimal tax holidays 

) | E(3) ¨ E(5) correspondingly.
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Table 7. Eectiveness of xed tax holidays
 

E(3) E(5)
( = 0:10)
-3% 4.3 0.942 0.988
-2% 3.9 0.977 0.970
-1% 3.4 0.997 0.942
0% 2.7 0.998 0.905
1% 2.1 0.982 0.860
2% 1.3 0.951 0.813
3% 0.5 0.908 0.763
( = 0:04)
-3% 10.5 0.043 0.259
-2% 9.7 0.124 0.434
-1% 8.6 0.310 0.672
0% 7.1 0.608 0.897
1% 5.4 0.868 0.996
2% 3.8 0.987 0.976
3% 2.4 0.993 0.904
( = 0:01)
-1% 19.1 0.000 0.000
0% 13.8 0.002 0.038
1% 8.1 0.475 0.794
1.5% 6.4 0.761 0.963
2% 5.0 0.916 0.999
3% 3.0 0.999 0.944
Tables 6 and 7 show that, for projects with a high level of volatility, optimal
tax holidays (as well as both variants of the payback period) are within 2{5
years (except for highly dynamic projects with income growth rates of more
than 1% which need very few incentives). The eectiveness of 3- and 5-year
tax holidays is very high, so that tax revenues for 3-year holidays are dierent
from the optimal by not more than 5%.
For projects with low volatility, a specic feature is the lengthy duration of
optimal tax holidays, which signicantly exceed 5 years (except in cases of
large income growth rates). Therefore, the eectiveness of 5-year holidays
remains low for moderate growth rates (in the order of 1%) and are \almost
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zero" for projects with low dynamics (where  is about 0 or less).
Projects with moderate levels of volatility lie between the above two extremes.
Optimal tax holidays are close to 5 years, although they can be slightly longer.
The eectiveness of 5-year holidays is quite high, except only for negative
growth rates .
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
1. The consideration of risk and uncertainty factors during the estimation
of the eectiveness of investment projects is dicult to analyse even in the
stable economies, let alone in Russia. At the same time, it is obvious that
these factors play a very important role in investment decisions. The o-
cial methods (Metodicheskie rekomendatsii..., 1994) recommend calculating
the eectiveness of the project under dierent scenarios for changes in the
economic environment. The choice of such scenarios is made with expert
methods and often depends on subjective opinions.
The proposed model can be viewed as a highly aggregated description of
investor behaviour in the economic environment, which is subjected to dier-
ent stochastic uctuations and has certain \extreme properties". Our main
hypothesis is an assumption of the distribution of the prots of investment
projects (geometric Brownian motion), which reects the element of unpre-
dictability (the chaotic character) of small changes in income, along with
their exponential growth or fall. Such a process is characterised only by two
parameters, which have clear economic sense: the expected instantaneous
rate of income growth and its variance (volatility, rate of uncertainty). These
parameters can be evaluated on the basis of known statistical methods and
regression analysis applied for observed virtual prots.
The most restrictive element of our hypothesis is the requirement for non-
negative revenues after the investment, but in the rst place it can be relaxed,
for example with the help of the introduction of a lag period between the
moment of investment and production of prots
10
, and in the second place,
there are now many projects (for example, in the energy sector or in the
revival of \frozen" lines of technology) which will bring prots immediately
(or within a short period of time) after the investment.
2. In the proposed model of investor behaviour, it was possible to obtain
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an explicit solution (in analytical form) of the investor problem, namely, to
nd the investment rule that maximises the investor's net present income
from the project. The optimal moment for investment was used to obtain
explicit formulas for such economic indicators as discounted investor revenue,
discounted tax payments into the regional and federal budgets, expected
speed-up of investment, and so on. Using obtained formulas, one can make
both quantitative calculations, and a theoretical analysis of the dependence
of the above-mentioned indicators on the parameters of the project and its
environment.
3. It is shown that investment activity (which characterises investor entry)
decreases if either the political risk or the volatility of the project increase.
At the same time, the eectiveness of the mechanism of tax holidays (the
ratio of participants' revenues under optimal tax exemptions to revenues when
there are no exemptions) increases either if political risk increases (in unstable
systems) or if the volatility of the project decreases.
4. A comparison was conducted of the inuence on investment activity of
dierent factors (such as tax rates and holidays, discount, and the rate of
political risk). It is shown that there exists a \critical" level for political risk
such that, if risk exceeds this level, it can not be compensated for (compared
with no-risk cases) by any tax exemptions (tax holidays).
5. The principle was proposed of the determination of \optimal" tax hol-
idays, which give maximum of expected discounted tax payments (over all
tax holidays) into the regional budget. It turned out that, for a wide range
of parameters, optimal tax holidays provide \almost" maximal probability of
real tax advantages for the region.
6. We have found a set of values for the parameters of the project and
its environment (the set of mutual benets), in which an increase in tax
exemptions is benecial to all participants, since it leads to an increase in
their revenues. As numerical calculations (using adjusted real data) show, if
tax holidays are short enough (approximately 34 years), a signicant increase
(by several times) can be achieved in the investor's NPV, tax payments into
the federal budget, and (to a smaller degree) tax payments into the regional
budget. The expected speed-up of investment is increased approximately by
4 5 years.
It was found out that the eectiveness of the mechanism of optimal tax
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holidays increases if the political risk increases (in unstable systems) and
decreases if the volatility of the project increases. For example, a growth of
eectiveness (in comparison with the absence of political risk) can be 1020%
(for the regional tax payments) and 30  50% (for the investor and federal
tax payments) and the expected speed-up of the investment can realise 45
years.
7. We compared the proposed \optimal" principle of the determination of
tax holidays with the real ones existing in Russian regions { i.e. \xed tax
holidays (usually for 3{5 years)" and \payback period" principles. It was
shown that real tax holidays are good enough (in duration and eectiveness
in comparison with optimal tax holidays) only for investment projects with
either a rather high volatility or a quite large expected income growth rate.
Moreover, there does not exist a single \real" principle which would be good
for all groups of projects. For investment projects with low expected income
growth rates and insuciently high volatility, the optimal tax holidays are
signicantly longer than those currently existing in reality, and it can increase
considerably tax payments into the regional budget.
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APPENDIX A. MAIN REGIONAL TAX EXEMPTIONS
FOR INVESTORS IN RUSSIA
The data are taken on the basis of the computerised information service and
publications in .
Vologda Region Exemptions from income tax for priority sectors. Decrease
in tax base.
Komi Republic Decrease in income tax to 50-90% during payback period,
property tax { 0.01%. Tax credits.
St.Petersburg Decreased income tax rate (20%).
Exemptions from income tax (decreased tax base), prop-
erty tax, housing tax, tax and rent credits.
Novgorod Region 1.Productive enterprises with foreign investments are ex-
empt from all regional taxes during the payback period.
2. In this region, there are four tax-free districts in which
enterprises are exempt from all regional and local taxes,
and also they are reimbursed for the federal income tax
paid.
Pskov Region Decrease in the income tax rate by 50% for 3 years (can
be extended to 10 years) for investments in sectors that
have priority in the region, and for enterprises engaged in
production for export (more than 50% of total volume),
or involved in leasing operations.
Vladimir Region Production enterprises with foreign investments are ex-
empt from income tax for 2 years, and under certain con-
ditions can pay 25% and 50% of income tax during the
third and fourth years.
Moscow Investment expenditures are substracted from income tax
(up to 25% of income taxes).
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Moscow Region For investments in production enterprises (more than
$1m) which have a payback period of less than 3 years:
1. For 1.5 years, the income tax rate is 10% and for the
next year { 15%.
2. Property tax is decreased by 50%.
Bryansk Region 1. Exemptions for investment projects (for investments
from other regions) concerning income, property and land
taxes according to the following rates:
1996 { 100%, 1997 { 80%, 1998 { 70%,
1999 { 60%, 2000 { 50%.
2. Joint ventures registered after January 1, 1996, where
foreign investors have more than 30% of the equity and
have invested more than $30,000, are exempt from in-
come and property taxes according to the following rates:
rst two years { 100%, third year { 75%,
fourth year { 50%.
3. Full tax exemption for new enterprises, and for the
reconstruction and modernisation of existing ones, during
the payback period but for no longer than 3 years. The
property rate for such enterprises is 0.2%. Exemptions
can be extended up to 10 years.
Ryazan Region For production enterprises with foreign investments of
more than $30,000, exemptions on income, property and
education taxes according to the following rates:
rst two years { 100%; third year { 75%;
fourth year { 50%.
Tver' Region 1. Decrease in income tax by 50% for up to 3 years (this
period can be extended up to 10 years).
2. For leasing companies { decrease in the rate of income
tax by 90% during the rst 3 years and by 50% during
the next 2.
3. The property tax rate is 0.2% for up to 3 years.
Yaroslavl Region 1. Income tax exemptions of 100% during the rst year.
2. Property tax is decreased by 50% (for investment
projects).
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Nizhni Novgorod
Region
1. Decreased income tax rate (21%).
2. Decreased income tax rate for enterprises that pay
taxes on time (up to 17%).
Kirov Region For direct foreign investments (greater than $30,000) in-
come tax is decreased:
for the rst two years { by 100%;
for the third and fourth years { by 90%.
Republic of
Mari El
For investments exceeding $100,000, exemptions on in-
come tax, property tax, value added tax, and transporta-
tion tax according to the following rates:
rst two years { 100%; third year { 75%;
fourth year { 50%; fth year { 25%.
For investments of less than $100,000| exemptions from
income taxes, property tax, value added tax and trans-
portation tax according to the following rates:
rst two years { 50%; next two years { 25%.
Republic of
Mordovia
For investment projects with foreign investments (greater
than $3m or more than 30% of shareholders' equity) for
3-5 years:
- income tax exemptions of 50
- property tax  a rate of 0.05%;
- exemption from land tax.
Republic of
Chuvashia
1. New Russian enterprises and enterprises with foreign
investment are exempt from all regional taxes (except
property tax) for 3 years.
2. Income tax is decreased to 5%, if the share of the for-
eign partner is more than 70% and greater than $100,000.
Belgorod Region Exemptions from income, property and land taxes accord-
ing to the rates:
rst year of start-up { 100%;
second year { 80%; third year { 60%.
Voronezh Region Exemptions from tax and rent payments for a certain pe-
riod, decrease in tax rates, tax credits for investments in
priority sectors.
Lipetsk Region Exemptions from income and property taxes for two years,
and during the next two years taxes are decreased by 50%.
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Republic of
Tatarstan
1. Decreased income tax rate (19%).
2. For new enterprises, exemptions on income tax accord-
ing to the following rates:
rst two years { 100%; third year { 75%;
fourth year { 50%.
Volgograd Region 1. Decrease in tax rates by 50% for new enterprises, or for
the reconstruction or modernisation of the existing ones,
for up to 2 years (exemptions can be extended up to 10
years).
2. Property tax rate of 1.0% for up to 3 years.
3. Tax investment credits for up to 2 years.
Ulyanovsk Region Exemptions from income, property and value added taxes
for 5 years.
Stavropol
Territory
1. Income tax exemptions of 50% during 2-3 years.
2. Income tax is decreased by 50% during the payback
period (but for no longer than 3 years) for the recon-
struction, modernisation or creation of new production
facilities.
3. Decrease in property tax by 50%.
4. Tax credits for 5 years.
Republic of
Bashkortostan
Small enterprises in priority sectors are exempt from in-
come tax according to the following rates:
rst two years { 100%, third year { 75%,
fourth year - 50%.
Udmurt Republic 1. Income and property tax exemptions for joint ventures,
where foreign investors have more than 30% of the equity
and have invested more than $30,000, according to the
following rates:
rst two years { 100%;
third year { 50%; fourth year - 25%.
2. Full tax exemption for new enterprises, or for the re-
construction and modernisation of existing ones, during
the payback period.
Perm' Region 1. Decreased income tax rate (17.5%).
2. Income tax exemptions (50%) for up to 3 years.
3. Income tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation
for small enterprises.
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Altai Territory,
Free Economic
Zone \Altai"
1.Exemption from all taxes, payments and fees paid into
the regional budget for 5 years.
2. Exemptions from income taxes and value added tax for
10 years (concerning the construction and exploitation of
priority objects only). During the next 5 years not more
than 50% of income taxes and value added tax are paid.
Omsk Region Decreased income tax rates (up to 13-19%) for some en-
terprises and organisations.
Republic of
Buryatia
1. Tax holidays for 3 years for direct foreign investments
of more than $5m; for other investments { for 2 years.
2. Decrease in tax payments by 10-15% of new equipment
costs.
Irkutsk Region Decreased income tax rates (15%) for some enterprises.
Primorski Ter-
ritory, Free Eco-
nomic Zone
\Nakhodka"
Regional income tax exemption for 5 years.
Khabarovsk
Territory
1. Income tax exemptions for 2 years for enterprises with
foreign investments (more than 30%) and subsidiaries of
foreign enterprises.
2. Income tax exemptions for 3 years for new enterprises
with foreign investments of more than $1m, that are used
for the mining of useful minerals, and for the construction
of the transport infrastructure.
Amur Region 1. Exemption from income tax during the rst year after
the beginning of the selling of production.
2. Decrease in property tax for 2 years.
3. Investment tax credits for 3-4 years for production
enterprises.
Sakhalin Region Exemption from income tax for 5 years for enterprises
with foreign investments.
Kaliningrad
Region
1. Income tax credits of up to 100% for 4-5 years.
2. Decreased tax rate (18%) for conversion and priority
enterprises.
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APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Denote F () = sup
2M
E

G(

)e
  11
, where G() = g   I; g =
1  b
   
, and supremum is taken over the set of all Markovian moments M:
12
The proof will consist of two stages.
Firstly, we show that, in nding the optimal stopping time for problem (2), it
is sucient to restrict our considerations only to the rst exit time over some
level by the process 
t
, i.e. that
F () = sup
z0
E

G(

z
)e
 
z
; (B1)
where 
z
= minft  0 : 
t
 zg { is the rst exit time over level z by process

t
. Note that statement (B1) is used, as a rule, without any arguments by
most authors (see McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994)),
while it is not obvious and needs strict justication because an arbitrary
Markovian moment can not be represented in general as a rst exit time from
a particular set.
For proving (B1), we can dene the operator  q() = sup
t0
E

q(
t
)e
 t
.
Show that this operator maps convex functions into convex. Indeed, let q()
be a convex function, and Q
t
() = E

q(
t
). Then, using representation (6)
for 
t
, we have (here ~ =   
2
=2)
Q
t


0
+ 
00
2

= Eq


0
+ 
00
2
e
~t+w
t


1
2
Eq
 

0
e
~t+w
t

+
1
2
Eq
 

00
e
~t+w
t

=
1
2
Q
t
(
0
) +
1
2
Q
t
(
00
):
Therefore,  q() will be convex as the supremum of the family of convex
functions fQ
t
()e
 t
; t  0g. Hence, due to the relationship:
F () = lim
N!1
 
N
G(); (B2)
where  
N
is the N -th degree of operator   (see, for example, Shiryaev (1969),
Chapter 3), the function F () will also be convex.
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Moreover, it is easy to see that
 G() = sup
t0
e
 t
E

(g
t
  I) = sup
t0
e
 t
(ge
t
  I)
=
8
>
<
>
:
G(); if   0;  > 0
G(); if  > 0;  > 
1
C  
=
; if  > 0;   
1
;
where C = 

   
I

= 1

g


=
; 
1
= I

g(   )
. It means that
 G() = G() for  > 
1
. Using similar arguments, one can prove that
there are real numbers f
N
; N = 2; 3; : : :g such that  
N
G() = G() for
 > 
N
(without loss of generality, we can consider that 
N
increase in N ).
So, from (B2), it follows that F () = G() for all suciently large  > 
(we can not except, in general, the case  = 1). According to general
theory, the rst arrival time at the set D = f  0 : F () = G()g by
the process 
t
will be an optimal stopping time for problem (2) (see Shiryaev
(1969), Chapter 3). Our previous considerations imply that this set D is an
unbounded semi-interval f : z    1g for some z. This proves (B1).
The second stage is to obtain a formula for the optimal stopping time 

().
For this purpose, the \smooth pasting" method for dierential equations with
free boundaries is commonly used (McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)).
13
But the strict justication of the fact that the \smooth
pasting" condition leads to an optimal solution requires rather developed and
complicated tools (as in Shiryaev, et al. (1994)). Here, we use another
approach which seems to us more straightforward and simple.
We need the following:
Lemma. 
t

z
= minft  0 : 
t
 zgz > 
0

t
 > 0
Ee
 
z
=


0
z

()
; (B3)
()
1
2

2
(   1) +     = 0:
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From the theory of boundary problems for diusion processes, it follows
that the function v() = E

e
 
z
will be the solution to the following dif-
ferential equation:
v() = v
0
() +
1
2

2

2
v
00
() (0 <  < z) (B4)
with the boundary condition v(z) = 1 (see Gikhman and Skorokhod (1977),
Chapter 8).
The general solution to equation (B4) can be written as v() = C
1


1
+
C
2


2
, where 
1
is a positive root, and 
2
is a negative root of the equation
1
2

2
( 1)+  = 0. Since for  = 0 the process is trivial - 
t
= 0 8t
- then, for this case, 
z
= 1 and, therefore, v(0) = 0, and consequently
C
2
= 0. Establishing C
1
from the boundary condition v(z) = 1, we get
formula (B3). Q.E.D.
Applying this Lemma we have: if z > 
0
, then
E

G(

z
)e
 
z
= E

(g

z
  I)e
 
z
= (gz   I)


z


Since 
z
= 0, whenever   z, then, according to equation (B1):
F () = maxfg   I; sup
z
(gz   I)(=z)

g: (B5)
Taking a derivative of the function f(z) = (gz   I)z
 
, we have f
0
(z) = 0
at the point z = z

=
I
g(   1)
. Moreover, f
00
(z

) =  I(z

)
  2
< 0.
This means that the last supremum in formula (B5) is achieved at the
point z

=
I
g(   1)
and the corresponding optimal stopping time will be


= minft  0 : 
t
 z

g (note that 

= 0 whenever   z

). This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Using relationships (8){(10) as well as formula (B3), we have:
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
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:
For proving 3) { 5), let us dierentiate both sides of formula (B3) in :
E

e
 

=

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


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0
() log
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
:
Dierentiating the equation
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()(()  1)+()   = 0 in , we get
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. Therefore:
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Note also, that:
Pf

<1g = lim
!0
Ee
 

: (B7)
Let us study the behaviour of () { the positive root of the equation:
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
2


=  (B8);
when  ! 0.
If  >
1
2

2
then, from (B8), it follows that () ! 0 when  ! 0, while
(B7) implies that:
Pf

<1g = 1:
Taking a limit to (B6) when  ! 0, we get E

= ( 
1
2

2
)
 1
log(

=
0
).
If  =
1
2

2
then, from (B8), we have () =
p
= and, by virtue of (B6):
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If  <
1
2

2
, then, due to (B8), () ! 1  2=
2
and (B7) implies:
Pf

<1g =


0



1 2=
2
< 1;
hence, E

=1.
Theorem 2 is proved completely.
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Notes
1. We will refer to the creation of a enterprise, not the reconstruction of
an one, because we mean that a taxpayer will appear.
2. By the initial period of time we mean the moment when the project
becomes available for investment.
3. In this study, we dene the prot of the rm as its .
4. Partial exemptions do not change the picture cardinally, they just make
the formulas more complicated. Consequently, we consider only tax
holidays with full exemptions.
5. As a weaker condition, one can consider the case \with a lag", when
a project begins to return positive prots after some period of time
following the investment.
6. If a set of such t is empty, then put 

=1.
7. Dependence on the other parameters has a less denite character and
can vary depending on the composition of the input parameters.
8. These data were kindly submitted by Prof. S.A.Smolyak on the basis
of experience with real investment projects in Russia.
9. In several regions, including Pskov and Tver, Altay territory, and Chu-
vashia, there is a possibility of extending the holidays up to 10 years.
10. This case was considered in the diploma thesis of S.V. Arkina (Moscow
State University, 1997).
11. This notation means that the process 
t
starts from the deterministic
state 
0
.
12. We also accept in general innite values (with a positive probability).
13. For our problem, this method consists of nding such a function s()
and a level z

inside the continuation region that they form a solution
to the so-called Stefan's problem with a free boundary, namely they
satisfy the following Bellman equation:
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12

2

2
s
00
() + s
0
()   s() = 0
and the boundary conditions:
s(0) = 0; s(z

) = G(z

); s
0
(z

) = G
0
(z

):
As a rule in `economic' literature (see, e.g. McDonald and Siegel
(1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), McKean (1965), Merton (1973)),
it is supposed without any argument that s() = F () and, hence,
the optimal stopping point is specied by the level z

. It is not di-
cult to give an example when there exists a unique solution to Stefan's
problem, but it is not a solution to the optimal stopping problem. The
general optimal stopping theory proposes some conditions under which
Stefan's problem is equivalent to an optimal stopping problem (see
Shiryaev (1969)). But, unfortunately, these conditions are very hard to
check, and the \smooth pasting" method is considered for the concrete
problems to be a heuristic approach to nding a solution which needs
additional proof of its optimality (see Shiryaev (1969), Shiryaev et al.
(1994)).
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